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Abstract 
This paper studies a possibility of efficiency improvement by child benefit programs in an overlapping 
generations economy with endogenous fertility and government debt. We derive conditions for improving an 
efficiency by child benefit using Representative-Consumer efficiency (RC-efficiency), an efficiency criterion 
for an endogenous fertility setting developed by Michel and Wigniolle (2007).  
It is shown that the result crucially depends on the relative amount of accumulated government debt in 
the economy. It is likely to hold in an economy of developed countries with a low fertility rate. We provide an 
implication of the results in the real economy.  
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1. Introduction   
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between child benefit and fiscal 
burden in the setting of an overlapping generation model with endogenous fertility. 
Lump-sum tax and public debt can be resources of child benefit. Although the tax burden of 
each generation is concentrated on its respective working period, this period also 
corresponds to the child-rearing period in some cases. Therefore, implementing child 
                                                   
1 This paper was presented at the First Workshop on Demography and Public Finance at Hitotsubashi 
University in March 7, 2009. We are grateful for helpful comments and discussions from Takashi OSHIO 
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ISHIDA (University of Michigan, US), and the workshop participants. Takahata was supported by a grant 
from Global COE program “Research Unit for Statistical and Empirical Analysis in Social Sciences.” 
Finally, the opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the 
organizations to which we belong. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors. 
                                           
 
  
 
2 
 
benefit programs financed by lump-sum tax in an exogenous fertility setting is a zero-sum 
game in that it transfers the fiscal burden to the same generation. On the other hand, 
financing child benefit programs by issuing debt is a zero-sum game in that it transfers the 
fiscal burden from the current generation to the future generation. In this paper, we focus 
mainly on child benefit financed by public debt in an endogenous fertility setting. Also, if 
certain conditions are satisfied, we clarify that the benefit has the potential to improve each 
generation's utility through the mitigation of per-capita fiscal burden.  
In industrialized countries, the fiscal burden has been increasing. In Japan, especially, 
the debt-GDP ratio is the highest among industrialized countries, even beyond that of Italy. 
As is well known, the sustainability of the Japanese fiscal and social security system is 
declining because of its low fertility rate, aging, and decreasing population. This situation is 
due to the fact that Japan now holds public debt explicitly and implicitly: the explicit debt 
is about 180% to GDP with regard to government bonds and the implicit debt is about 
230% with regard to the social security system, public pension, medical insurance, and 
elderly assistance. Therefore, Japan holds a total of approximately 410% public debt to 
GDP.   
 
Table1. Public Debt-GDP ratio and Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of Industrialized Countries 
Country Japan Italy France Germany UK US 
Public 
Debt 
1.71 1.17 0.71 0.64 0.50 0.66 
TFR 1.33 1.32 1.87 1.28 1.66 2.04 
 
Source: United Nations (2006) “Population, Resources, Environment and Development.”  
 
Moreover, the baby boomer generation comprising the largest population is now 
moving over to the benefit side of the social security system. Thus,  attempts to reduce the 
benefit will face political limitations. This means that the 410% public debt must be paid 
mainly by the current working generation and future generations.  
In addition, the fertility rate in Japan has been decreasing since the baby boom in the 
1950s. To maintain the population level, it is considered necessary for a woman to have 
2.08 children. The total fertility rate in Japan was above 2.08 before the 1970s, but since 
then, it has fallen below that number. The relationship between (explicit) debt-GDP ratio 
and fertility rate in developed countries is shown in Table 1.  
These demographic factors raise the following question: what is the most economically 
efficient way for  the burden to be shared by each generation? The answer will essentially 
differ depending on whether the model is exogenous fertility or endogenous fertility.  
For this reason recent studies have clarified that the Pareto-efficiency condition of the 
exogenous fertility model differs from that of endogenous. First, in the case of an 
exogenous fertility model, we make use of the overlapping generations (OLG) model which 
was introduced by Diamond (1965). Three types of steady states exist in the model: 
under-accumulation, golden rule, and over-accumulation. The first two steady states are 
Pareto-efficient, but the third is not. In addition, an empirical study by Abel, Mankiw, 
Summers, and Zeckhauser (1989) reports that in industrialized countries dynamic 
efficiency is satisfied. In a steady state, dynamic efficiency corresponds to 
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under-accumulation (or golden rule). Therefore, the possibility that industrialized countries 
are in the state of under-accumulation seems high. In an exogenous fertility setting, an 
allocation is said to be Pareto-efficient if it is impossible to make some individuals better 
off without making other individuals worse off. For this reason, in an exogenous case, we 
cannot improve any generation's utility while at the same time sacrificing another 
generation's utility.  
However, recent studies clarify the properties of the competitive equilibrium with an 
endogenous fertility setting. Raut and Srinivasan (1994) and Charkrabarti (1999) analyze 
the properties of the inter-temporal equilibrium with endogenous fertility. Conde-Ruiz et al. 
(2002) and Golosov et al. (2004) present the definition of Pareto-efficiency criteria in an 
endogenous fertility framework.  
As a development of these studies, surprisingly, Michel and Wigniolle (2007)
2
 point 
out the possibility that under-accumulation may not be efficient in an endogenous fertility 
setting. This implies that there is a possibility of improving one generation's welfare 
without making another generation's welfare worse off by some policies, even when it is in 
an under-accumulation state near the steady state. Moreover, the remarkable point of 
Michel and Wigniolle (2007) is to clarify that the Representative-Consumer efficient 
(RC-efficient) condition, which is a concept developed in their study, deeply connects with 
the sign-of-inequality relationship between the child-rearing cost and wage rate. That is, if 
by some policies we can give some effects to this relationship, we would have a possibility 
to improve RC-efficiency.  
Michel and Wigniolle (2007) provide proof that, by utilizing an OLG model with 
endogenous population growth, the possibility to improve RC-efficiency also exists in the 
case of under-accumulation. But they did not analyze an economy model with public debt. 
Therefore, we have great interest in the possibility of improving RC-efficiency in an 
economy with huge public debt, low fertility rate, and endogenous population growth.  
Therefore, we should focus on the child benefit programs financed by debt. The policy 
has the possibility to affect the conditions of RC-efficiency through the following path. 
First, there is a path of reducing the per-capita fiscal burden through fertility rate increase, 
which is found in even a simple model without capital accumulation. Second, as is shown 
in a model with capital accumulation, child benefit may affect an individual’s expenditure 
through the current fertility level and interest rate which causes the consumption amount in 
the second period. The first condition has particular effect when an economy holds huge 
public debt like that of Japan.  
Intuitively, there is a possibility to attain RC-improvement by a child benefit program 
financed by newly issued debt when the accumulated amount of debt is huge. This is 
because of the following logic. Suppose we have a child benefit program financed by newly 
issued debt and it raises the fertility rate to a certain level. An influence of newly issued 
                                                   
2Although there have been several approaches that endogenize fertility decisions, Michel and Wigniolle 
(2007) depend on the benchmark framework, which assumes that children are consumption goods that 
appear in the utility function of the parents. The basic articles are Becker (1960), Willis (1973), and 
Eckstein and Wolpin (1985). Other approaches depend on the literature based on the additional 
assumption of descendant altruism, as in Becker and Barro (1988) or the assumption of ascendant 
altruism and strategic behavior of parents, as in Nishimura and Zhang (1992). 
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debt to the accumulated debt is different depending on the size of accumulated debt. If the 
effect of the rise in fertility is the same regardless of the amount of accumulated debt, then 
such a policy may lessen per-capita debt without harming any generation. In this scenario, 
even the initial generation is not made worse off since they do not need to endure the 
burden. The problem of worsening the situation of the initial generation might occur if a 
child benefit program were financed by a lump-sum tax. We will show situation using a 
simple model first intuitively, and derive conditions in a general setting after that.  
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce a simple model for 
grasping an intuitive understanding. In Section 3, we will set the model for our main 
analysis. In Section 4, we derive the conditions of RC-improvement using the model. In 
Section 5, we analyze the superiority of public debt and tax with child benefit financing, as 
continuing discussions of Sections 3 and 4.. Section 6 presents some concluding remarks.  
 
2. Simple analysis   
In this section, we analyze a simple model to show the characteristics of child benefit 
financed by public debt as preparation for analyzing the rigorous model in the next section. 
As an example, we first make an intuitive analysis of the relationship between child benefit 
and fiscal burden in a case with intergeneration-selfishness in a simple economy with only 
two generations: parent generation and child generation. Next, by using an OLG model 
with only two generations, we show the possibility that the child benefit improves 
RC-efficiency.  
First,, for simplicity, we consider the economy only with two generations, the first and 
the second generation. Individuals live two periods, young and old, and they have children 
when they are young. We assume that the second (young) generation does not have 
children, and that the government expenditure is set to zero in the baseline case. The debt 
amount at the beginning is set to D , and the government subsidizes  per child for 
child-rearing activity, financed by issuing bonds. In this simple model, we let N  denote 
the population of the first generation, nN  that of the second generation, r  interest rate, 
z  child-rearing cost, 
j
X and 
j
Y  the consumption when young and old, W the lifetime 
income, and the fiscal burden in lump-sum tax 
j
T ( 2,1j ). Using the above, we get the 
following budget constraints for a representative household:  
11
1
1
1
)( TW
r
Y
Xnz 

    (1) 
22
2
2
1
TW
r
Y
X 

    (2) 
The intertemporal government budget constraint is the following:  
nN
r
T
NTnND


1
2
1
    (3) 
Solving per capita fiscal burden of the second generation from equation (1) to (3), we 
get the following relationship:  
nN
NTnND
rT 1
2
)1(



   (4) 
If 0/
2
 T  is satisfied, enlarging child benefit programs financed by bond will 
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decrease the fiscal burden of the second generation. It is possible to rewrite the condition as 
in the following: 
n
n
d



  







n
n
TNDdwhere
n
　　　 and/,
1
   (5) 
The left-hand side represents the fiscal burden of the second generation. On the other 
hand, the denominator of the right-hand side represents the elasticity of fertility to child 
benefit programs. As long as the ratio of child-rearing subsidy to elasticity is less than the 
per capita fiscal burden of the second generation, the child benefit programs decrease the 
per capita fiscal burden of the second generation. Specifically, the after-tax lifetime income 
of the second generation increases, which implies that the lifetime utility rises. The lifetime 
utility of the first generation also rises by the child benefit programs financed by bonds. In 
other words, in the case equation (5) holds, child-rearing policy financed by bonds may 
attain RC-improvement.   
 
3. Model   
In this section, we construct the model for considering the condition for having the 
child benefit financed by bonds to effect RC-improvement. The detailed settings are shown 
in the following.   
 
3.1. Household 
Generation t  lives two periods, period t  when they are young and period 1t  when 
old, earn lifetime income W , enjoy consumption 
t
X  when young and 
1t
Y  when old, and 
raise children 
t
n  at cost z , subsidized with 
t
 . Generation t  has to take over per capita 
debt 
t
d  from generation 1t  by paying lump-sum tax 
t
T  when young, and give their per 
capita debt 
1t
d  to the following generation 1t  when old. 
   
Assumption 1  U  is a function from 3

R  to }{R , and U  maps 3

R  to R , with 
./),,(everyfor ),,(lim),,( 33
),,(),,(


 RRYXnYXnUYXnU
YXnYXn
　  
   U  is twice continuously differentiable on 3

R , strictly concave, increasing in each 
argument, homogeneous of degree one, and satisfies the Inada conditions:  
.limlimlim
000
 





Y
Y
X
X
n
n
UUU  
 
In this case, the lifetime utility and the budget constraint of generation t  is described 
in the following:  
),,(
1

tttt
YXnUU    (6) 
tttttt
TWSXnz  )(     (7) 
ttt
SRY
11 
    (8) 
The first-order conditions for maximizing the lifetime utility are as follows:  
t
n
YtX
z
U
URU


1
   (9) 
                                           
 
  
 
6 
 
From the above equations, we can derive the following relationships:  
),,(
1 ttttt
RTWXX 

    (10) 
),,(
11 ttttt
RTWYY 

    (11) 
),,(
1 ttttt
RTWnn 

    (12) 
),,(
1 ttttt
RTWSS 

    (13) 
Functions X , Y , n , s  are defined on 3

R  and are continuously differentiable.   
 
3.2. Firm   
We assume that, in period t , there exists a representative firm producing goods with 
capital 
t
K  and labor 
t
L  under perfect competition using the following function which is 
homogeneous of degree one and we can define f  as )1,()( kFkf  .   
 
),(
ttt
LKFQ     (14) 
 
Assumption 2  

RR:f , and for all 0k , 0)(  kf  and 0)(  kf . 
 
Then we get the following condition from profit maximization:  

























t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
L
K
W
L
K
f
L
K
L
K
fW    (15) 
 

















t
t
t
t
t
L
K
R
L
K
fR    (16) 
 
3.3. Government   
Suppose that the population of generation t  is expressed as 
11 

ttt
NnN , and that the 
government subsidizes child-rearing under the following budget constraint: the 
reimbursement of per capita debt of generation 1t  and child-rearing subsidy 
t
  are 
financed by lump-sum tax 
t
T  and newly issued bond 
t
d :  
)(
11111 

tttttttttt
NnNdRNdNT   
⇔ 
ttt
t
tt
t
dR
n
dR
T 



1
1
1     (17) 
 
3.4. Market equilibrium   
Suppose that the labor market is balanced as 
tt
NL  , and that the capital and the saving 
in the capital market are balanced. Then, with 
ttt
NKk / , we have the following:  
)(and)(
tttt
kRRkWW  　　    (18) 
)(
1 tttt
dSNK 

   (19) 
The equation (19) is verified to be equivalent to the following commodity market 
clearing condition by simple operation:  
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ttttt
t
t
tttt
nRzn
n
Y
Xknkf  


 1
1
1
)(    (20) 
 
Definition 1  Starting from initial conditions 
1
N , 
0
N , 
0
K , and ))/((
10100 
 NKdRY , 
given debt management policies and child-rearing subsidies }),{(
0

ttt
d  , an inter-temporal 
equilibrium is a sequence }),,,,{(
0

tttttt
nYXNK , which satisfies (7)-(9) and (17)-(19).   
 
4. The inter-temporal equilibrium   
In this section, based on the model constructed above, we will examine the condition 
for the child benefit financed by issuing bonds to effect RC-improvement. Then an example 
with a simple function is considered.  
First, we will derive the condition of child benefit programs to improve lifetime utility 
of all generations without sacrificing welfare of any generation. It is difficult to derive such 
a condition rigorously in an analytical sense. In this paper, for simplicity, we assume that 
)(
t
UU  is homogeneous of degree one. In addition, we define the variables as the 
following:  
tt
t
t
TW
n
n

~  
tt
t
t
TW
X
X


~
 
tt
t
t
TW
Y
Y

 

1
1
~
   (21) 
tt
t
t
TW
S
S


~
 
.
~
tt
t
t
TW
d
d

  
.
~
tt
t
t
TW
U
U

  
The government budget constraint can be rewritten as  
t
ttttn
dR
t
d
dWR
T t
tt
~
1
~
1
~
~
1
1


 
 
 
And the budget constraints (7) and (8) can be transformed as the following:  
1
~
~~)(
1

t
t
ttt
R
Y
Xnz     (22) 
From equation (9) and (22), we can solve the variables of equation (21) as a function of 
),(
1

tt
Rz  . Substituting these variables into (19), we obtain the following:  
tttttttt
dRzSkRzn
~
),(
~
),(~
111


    (23) 
)(
11 ttt
kk 

  
 
Proposition 1 Given 
000
/ NKk   and })
~
{(
0

tt
d , an inter-temporal equilibrium is 
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characterized by the sequence }){(
0

tt
  such that 0t ,  
tttttttt
dkRzSkkRzn
~
)](,[
~
)](,[~
111


    (24) 
  
The proof is straightforward. A sequence 
0
)(
tt
k  is characterized by a sequence 
0
)(
tt
  
in this setting, while an inter-temporal equilibrium is characterized by a sequence 
0
)(
tt
k  in 
Michel and Wigniolle (2007). Hence, an inter-temporal equilibrium is characterized by a 
sequence 
0
)(
tt
 .  
We define the function   as:   
dkfzskkfznkz
~
)](,[~)](,[~),(    
     is defined on 2

R  and continuously differentiable. The equation (24) can be written 
as: 
0))(,(
1

 ttt
kz   
 
In this setting, the equation is no more dynamic since the function is only of 
1t
k  but 
not of 
t
k . Since 
1t
k is a function of 
t
 , once we have a sequence of 
0
)(
tt
 , a unique 
inter-temporal equilibrium 
0
)(
tt
  may exist. We would like to show this in the following. 
Before that, we need to make some assumptions on saving and fertility to the change of 
interest rate and child benefit.   
In the following we will deal with several cases in terms of preferences. In the first case, 
we will consider the case with preferences with which 0/
1

 tt
k   is satisfied. Next, we 
consider the opposite case. Before that, we assume the following in advance.   
 
Assumption 3  To the change of interest rate, assume that savings and fertility rates 
change as in the following:  
0~,0~ 
RR
ns  
 
Proposition 2  Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, 0
0
k , for any sequence 


0
}{
tt
 , there 
exists a unique inter-temporal equilibrium 
 01
}{
tt
k  starting from a given initial condition 
0
0
k . 
 
Proof  See Appendix A. 
 
The difference from Michel and Wigniolle (2007) is that there are no dynamics in k  in 
our model since we have assumed homogeneity with household preferences, which drops 
the effect of wage rate determined by the capital level in the same period.  
Our next interest is in the relationship between k  and  . In the following, we will 
consider two cases about this sign: one is the case when 0/  k , and the other is when 
0/  k . For this, we need to make additional assumptions about s  and n  to a change 
of . 
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Definition 2  An inter-temporal equilibrium 
0
),,,,(
tttttt
nYXNK  is said to be converging if 
the sequence 
ttt
NKk /  converges to a limit 0k  when t  goes to infinity. If 
t
k  
converges to a limit k , it is straightforward to show that )(
tt
kRR  , )(
tt
kWW  ,  
t
X , 
t
Y  
and nt  are converging to constant values R , W , X , Y  and n .   
 
Definition 3 A converging inter-temporal equilibrium 
0
),,,,(
tttttt
nYXNK  is said to 
converge in under-accumulation if nR  . It is said to converge in over-accumulation if  
nR  .   
 
Definition 4 (RC-allocation)  A feasible allocation with representative consumers (or 
RC-allocation) is a sequence 
0
),,,,(
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
nYXNK  of positive variables that satisfies 0t :  
zNYNXNKNKF
tttttttt 111
),(

  
.
1 ttt
NnN 

 
 
Definition 5 (RC-dominance)  Let 
0
),,,,(
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
nYXNK  for 2,1i  be two feasible 
RC-allocations. Allocation 1 is said to RC-dominate allocation 2 if it leads to a higher level 
of utility for all generations, with a strict improvement for (at least) one generation. 
Formally,  
),,,(),,(,0 22
1
211
1
1
tttttt
nYXUnYXUt

  
).,,(),,(such that,0 20
2
10
2
0
1
0
1
10
1
00 tttttt nYXUnYXUt   　　  
  
If Allocation 2 were changed to Allocation 1 by using child-benefit programs, 
RC-improvement would be achieved. 
 
4.1. Case 1: if 
ns 
   where  
t
t
t
t
n
t
t
t
t
s
n
n
s
s 




 





 ,  
  
First we will consider the sign of 
tt
k 

/
1
. Taking the derivative of (23) with respect to  
t
  in this case, we have:  
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
tt
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
R
R
SSk
nk
R
R
n
k
n
 

















 






1
1
1
1
1
1
1
~~~
~
~~
 
 
0~
1
1
11
1
1
~
1
~
~
1
~
1 










 












t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
k
R
R
S
tk
R
R
n
t
S
t
n
t
t
kn
kk 

　　    (25) 
  
Provided Assumption 3, we can derive the following proposition.   
 
Proposition 3  RC-improvement is achieved by child benefit with public debt resources 
when the following is true:  
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1
1


t
t
Rtt
R
Y
n

    (26) 
t
tt
n
d
n 


    (27) 
where  
., 1
1 t
t
t
t
R
t
t
t
t
n
R
R
n
n 




 





 

 
 
Proof  See Appendix B.  
 
The first condition implies that the income from child benefit programs must exceed the 
loss of the second period consumption from a decrease in interest rate. If individuals 
originally plan to consume much in their second period, an interest rate decrease might 
make them worse off because of negative income effects. On the other hand, if individuals 
originally have children, child benefit may bring positive income effects. For satisfying the 
condition, it is necessary for the second effect to dominate the first. It is possible to 
consider that if the elasticity is small enough, the condition is satisfied as long as there 
exists a certain level of child benefit programs.  
The second condition requires that the elasticity of fertility rate to child benefit be 
bigger than the ratio of per-capita amount of child benefit to that of accumulated debt. In 
countries which have a huge amount of accumulated debt with a relatively small level of 
child benefit, the second condition is likely to hold; meanwhile it requires that the child 
benefit programs be bigger for the first condition to be true.  
It is interesting that equation (27) and (5) are exactly the same. This implies that this 
condition (27) more likely holds as the amount of per capita debt is larger, which is true for 
the financial situation of the government sector in Japan, which we have already examined 
in the simple analysis in Section 2. However, in the model of this section with capital 
accumulation, we need the additional condition (26). It would be possible to examine the 
possibility of RC-improvement by child-rearing subsidies financed by bonds if we can 
confirm that those equations (26) and (27) may actually hold in an empirical analysis. An 
interesting point is whether it is possible to implement RC-improvement in the real 
economy.  
We will briefly discuss that possibility in the following with particular focus on the case 
of the Japanese economy which has a huge amount of per-capita debt and low fertility rate. 
From (26) and (27), we can derive the condition of 
t
  as in the following:  
tt
t
Rt
t
tn
nR
Y
n
d
1
1

 
 

 
Although it is hard to estimate the actual elasticities of the Japanese economy, 
R
  is 
not considered too high, and it might be almost zero. The Japanese economy is large 
enough that the interest rate is almost unaffected by such a policy. On the other hand, 
n
  
could be assumed to be 0.05, which implies that the 100% increase of child benefit would 
entail 10% of increase in fertility rate. In this case, when the child benefit increases from 
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10,000 yen to 20,000 yen every month, the fertility rate might increase from 1.34 to 1.39. If 
the debt amount 
t
d  is 20 million yen, then as long as child benefit per child is below 1 
million yen, this condition satisfies.  
Though the population has not been decreasing dramatically at present, in future it will 
decline much more rapidly. In such a case, the per capita amount of debt will increase 
dramatically and there would be a greater possibility for RC-improvement. 
 
4.2. Case 2: if 0~ 

s  and 0~ 

n  are satisfied   
First we will consider the sign of  
tt
k 

/
1
 .  
 
0~
1
1
11
1
1
~
1
~
~
1
~
1 









 












t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
k
R
R
S
tk
R
R
n
t
S
t
n
t
t
kn
kk 

   (25’) 
 
In this case, we need the conditions for improving efficiency as discussed above.   
 
Proposition 4  RC-improvement is achieved by child benefit with public debt resources 
when the following is true:  
1
11
1
1
~
~
)1(~
~



 
t
tt
R
tt
tt
WRn
d
n
dR
nW 
     (28) 
where  
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
R
W
W
R
R
W












 



1
1
1
1
,　  
 
Proof  See Appendix C.  
 
This condition implies that the elasticity of fertility rate to child benefit should be high 
enough to dominate the right-hand-side effects. We will consider a small change of 
t
 . 
First, when the elasticity of k  to   is considered to be not too high, it is likely for the 
condition to be satisfied. In that case, both 
R
  and 
W
  are close to zero, which  
renders the right-hand side of (28) also close to zero and facilitates satisfying the condition.  
Second, when 
1t
d  is increases, the condition becomes more likely to be satisfied, as 
shown in Proposition 3. It shows that the possibility to improve efficiency by child benefit 
is higher in both cases when the amount of existing debt is huge.   
 
Example 1  We assume specific forms for preferences and production technology in the 
above model. Suppose we have preferences:  
 

 1
1ttt
YXnU  
and production technology:  
.)( 
ttt
kAkf   
Then the sufficient conditions for RC-improvement are  
 







)1)(1(
~
1
1/
t
tt
d
z    (29) 
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and  
  1
~
)1)(1(
21
ddd
t
   (30) 
 
See Appendix D for the detailed calculation to derive the above results.   
 
In this example, it is possible to examine a quantitative exercise about RC-improvement 
in the real economy. Since our concern is whether RC-improvement occurs through 
adjusting the child benefit amount, providing the parameters of the above function from the 
real economy, we can derive the exact condition for RC-improvement.  
In a typical economy in the world, capital income ratio   is 0.3. Suppose that the 
preference   over children sets 0.025 or 0.005, and the preference   over consumption 
during the young period sets 0.6 or 0.7, then we can calculate the parameter   of (29) as 
Table 2. This parameter   is the upper limit of the child benefit amount under the 
constraint that 
t
d
~
 satisfies (30).  
Namely, as long as the economy satisfies the condition of z/ , we can implement 
RC-improvement in the economy by increasing the child benefit. In such a case, only the 
amount of debt matters while the fertility rate does not.  
 
5. Debt financing vs tax financing 
In this section, we analyze mainly the superiority of public debt or lump-sum tax with 
child benefit financing as a discussion continuing from previous sections. To this end, we 
change the budget constraint of the government sector in our model, as follows:  
    
ttttt
t
tt
t
ndR
n
dR
T  



1
1
1 )1(     (31) 
where   stands for the ratio of tax resource to child-rearing support: if 1 , then child 
benefit is financed by tax only, and  if 0 , this is financed by public debt only. 
   Then, from (21) and (31), we can derive the indirect utility function, as follows: 
      









   ),(),,(),,(),,,,(),( 1
~~
1
~~
1
~~~~
1
~
11
~
tttttttttttt
dYdXdnUddTdWU      (32) 
where 
 
)1(
)1(
),,,,(
~~
~~
1
1
~
1
~
~
1
~
1
ttt
ttttttt
t
tt
tttt
nd
nWdWR
n
dR
ddT










 
   In this setting, we can derive the following proposition under the assumption for the 
preferences and production technology of Example 1. 
 
Proposition 5  In the case of Example 1 with 
tt
 
1
and tt dd
~
1
~
 , when *
~
dd t  ,
 
all tax 
financing ( 1 ) is optimal. On the other hand, when *
~
dd t  , all debt financing ( 0 ) is 
optimal if *0  
t
and all tax financing ( 1 ) is optimal if z
t
 * .Where *d and 
* denotes as follows: 
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




1
1*d  
z
d 












)1()1)(1(
1*
~
 
 
Proof  See Appendix E. 
 
According to Proposition 5, debt financing is optimal only in the case of *
~
dd t  . In 
addition, the condition that the sign of *d  is positive as follows: 
0
1
1 




  
⇔ 





1
1
   
 (33) 
And, to the consumption smoothing during young and old periods, we assume the 
following. 
 
Assumption 4  The preference parameters of Example 1 satisfy the following 
relationship. 
 1  
⇔  21
   
(34) 
 
Then, from the constraint of 0 , (33) and (34), we can derive the following corollary, 
as the necessary conditions with regards to debt financing.  
 
Corollary 1  Under Proposition 4 and Assumption 4, the necessary condition that debt 
financing is optimal is 3/1 . 
 
Proof  First, )1/(1   is derived from (33) and 0 . Next, )1/(   is derived 
from (33) and (34). Hence, from these relationships, 1)1/(2  
 
holds. 
 
  Moreover, we can derive the following proposition and example in the case of tax 
financing, as in previous sections. 
 
Proposition 6  RC-improvement is achieved by child benefit with lump-sum tax resources 
when the following is true:  
   Case 1: if 
ns 
    
t
t
t
Rt
Y
R
n


1
1
1


  and 
tttt
RWnd /~
~
11 
    (35) 
   Case 2: if 0~ 

s  and 0~ 

n  
1
1
~
~


tt
tt
WRn
dR
Wn
   and tttt RWnd /
~~
11 
    (36) 
                                           
 
  
 
14 
 
 
Proof  See Appendix F. 
 
Example 2  We assume the preferences and production technology with Example 1. Then 
the sufficient condition for RC-improvement of Proposition 6 is  
)1/(1
1~





t
d    (37) 
 
See Appendix G for the detailed calculation to derive the above results. 
 
6. Conclusion   
In this paper, we derive the condition of RC-efficiency in an endogenous population 
growth setting. According to this, when the elasticity of interest rate to child benefit policy 
is close to zero and there exists a huge amount of accumulated debt, having a certain level 
of child benefit programs financed by issuing debt and lump-sum tax is RC-improving.  
The weakness of this study is the assumptions we made on the preferences, such as 
homogeneity. This study report would be more worthwhile if it were possible to show those 
results more generally. We will take over this assignment in a following study.   
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Table 2. Range of Child Benefit with RC-improvement 
 
 
1) Case 1: 3.0 , 025.0
 
and 　6.0  or 　7.0 . 
 
Preference Parameters of Utility Debt Parameters 
Upper Limit  
of  
Child Benefit 

 

 
 1
 
d
~
 1d  2d    
0.025  0.700  0.275  0.220  0.218  0.275  0.125  
0.025  0.700  0.275  0.230  0.218  0.275  0.417  
0.025  0.700  0.275  0.240  0.218  0.275  0.563  
0.025  0.700  0.275  0.250  0.218  0.275  0.650  
0.025  0.700  0.275  0.260  0.218  0.275  0.708  
0.025  0.700  0.275  0.270  0.218  0.275  0.750  
              
0.025  0.600  0.375  0.290  0.288  0.375  0.125  
0.025  0.600  0.375  0.300  0.288  0.375  0.417  
0.025  0.600  0.375  0.310  0.288  0.375  0.563  
0.025  0.600  0.375  0.320  0.288  0.375  0.650  
0.025  0.600  0.375  0.330  0.288  0.375  0.708  
0.025  0.600  0.375  0.340  0.288  0.375  0.750  
0.025  0.600  0.375  0.350  0.288  0.375  0.781  
0.025  0.600  0.375  0.360  0.288  0.375  0.806  
0.025  0.600  0.375  0.370  0.288  0.375  0.825  
 
 
 
2) Case 2 : 3.0 , 05.0
 
and 　6.0  or 　7.0 . 
 
Preference Parameters of Utility Debt Parameters 
Upper Limit 
of  
Child Benefiｔ 

 

 
 1
 
d
~
 1d  2d    
0.050  0.700  0.250  0.230  0.225  0.250  0.125  
0.050  0.700  0.250  0.240  0.225  0.250  0.300  
              
0.050  0.600  0.350  0.300  0.295  0.350  0.125  
0.050  0.600  0.350  0.310  0.295  0.350  0.300  
0.050  0.600  0.350  0.320  0.295  0.350  0.417  
0.050  0.600  0.350  0.330  0.295  0.350  0.500  
0.050  0.600  0.350  0.340  0.295  0.350  0.563  
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 2 
 
It is possible to show this with the same logic as Michel and Wigniolle (2007). We will 
follow their proof for the most part and change the different points. In equilibrium, the 
market adjusts only the capital level, and we do not need to consider a change of  . Hence, 
for a given sequence of 
0
}{
tt
 ,  is represented in the following way: 
~~~
)](',[)](',[),( dkfzskkfznkz 

 . 
 
We will show that 0  has a unique solution. In order to show this, we will check the 
property of  . First, we will check monotonicity of this function. The derivative of the 
first term kkkfzn 

/))](',[(
~
  is positive, since )(' kfR   is monotonically decreasing in 
k  and 0
~

R
n . The derivative of the second term kkfzs 

/)](',[
~
  is negative, since 0
~

R
s . 
Hence,   is increasing in k . 
    
Next, suppose we have a certain level of child benefit  . At this time, when k  goes to 
0 , it can be bounded in such a way that 1k  )1(')(' fkf  . Then we obtain the following 
inequalities: 
)]1(',[)](',[
)]1(',[)](',[
~~
~~
fzskfzs
fznkfzn




 
and thus 
~~~
)]1(',[)]1(',[),( dfzskfznkz   . 
Finally, we have 
0)]1(',[),(lim
~~
0


dfzskz
k
 . 
When k  goes to  , we can prove the following by using the contrary thought as 
1k  )1(')(' fkf  . We then obtain the following inequality: 
~~~
)]1(',[)]1(',[),( dfzskfznkz   . 
Thus 


),(lim kz
k
 . 
Hence, for any given sequence 


0
}{
tt
 , a unique inter-temporal equilibrium 
 01
}{
tt
k  
exists and the proposition has been proven. 
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Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 3 
 
We will use (25) in the proof. Calculate the change of lifetime utility 
t
U  when the 
amount of child benefit 
t
  is raised:  
)(
~
~
~
~~
~
~~
~
~
)( 1
1
tttt
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
ttt
TWU
Y
Y
UX
X
Un
n
U
TWU 






















 



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~
~
~
~~
~
~~
~
~
)(
1
1
1
1







































tt
t
t
tt
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
ttt
T
W
U
Y
Y
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X
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n
U
TWU 



 
It is possible to transform this equation using the household first-order conditions  
.
~
~
1
~~
)()(
1
1
1
1

































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t
t
tt
t
t
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t
t
t
tttt
T
W
U
Y
R
Xn
zTWU 



  
Moreover, taking derivative of equation (22) with respect to
t
 , we obtain  
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
tt
t
t
t
t
Y
R
R
n
Y
R
Xn
z
~1~
~
1
~~
)( 1
2
1
1
1





















 



 
then, by substituting this into the above equation, we have the following equation:  













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

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    (A-1) 
where  
 
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1
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1
1
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

 
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Using this, we can rewrite as  
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t
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
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This equation represents the effect of the change in child-rearing subsidies }){(
0



tt
  on 
lifetime utility of generation t , given a set of debt policies }){(
0

tt
d . If the sign of the big 
parenthesis of the first term and the coefficient of the second term are both positive, it is 
possible to bring welfare improvement to all generations by enlarging child benefit 
programs since the sign of 
t
U
~
is positive from homogeneity. Moreover, since 0/
1

tt
W   
from equation (15) and (25), the latter is always true in the case that the coefficient sign of 
the first term is positive. Namely, the sufficient condition of RC-improvement is as follows:  
t
t
t
Rt
Y
R
n


1
1
1 

    (A-2) 
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t
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and  
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This form (A-3) holds when  
0
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As a result of (A-2), (A-4) and (A-5), we can get the following sufficient conditions for 
RC-improvement: 
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Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 4 
 
We will use (25') in the proof. Calculate the change of lifetime utility 
t
U  when the 
amount of child benefit 
t
  is raised, we can use the result already obtained from the 
previous section:  
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The first term is always positive in this case. We are interested in the sign of the second 
term. To have sufficient conditions for improving the utility level, the term should be 
positive. Hence,  
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Hence, the sufficient condition is shown in the following:  
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Appendix D: Calculation of Example 1 
 
The first-order conditions from household optimization are  
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Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 5 
 
In the indirect utility function (32), ),,,,(
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1
 tttt ddT  depends on the parameter  . 
Hence, under the assumption that  and 
~
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To search for the optimal value  of (D-1), we analyze the sign of the function  /T  
using the preferences and production technology of Example 1.  
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The sign of (D-4) is subject to the following rules: 
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Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 6 
 
We will use (25) and (25') in the proof. Calculate the change of lifetime utility 
t
U  
when the amount of child benefit 
t
  is raised, we can use (31) with 1
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tt
t
t
t
tttt
Y
R
R
nTWU 

 













1
1
2
1
~1~)(
1
1
1
~
1
~~1
~~~
~
1






































t
t
ttt
ttttttn
R
t
t
t
nd
nWdWd
W
U
t
t





                   
ttt
ttt
ttn
R
t
n
nd
Wd
U t
t





  ~
)~
~
1(
~
~
2
1
~
1    (F-2) 
 
Case 1: if 
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In this case, we are interested in the sign of all terms of (F-2). For having sufficient 
conditions for improving utility level, the terms should be positive. Hence,  
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The condition is calculated in the following:  
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In this case, the first term of (F-2) is always positive. We are interested only in the sign 
of the second term and the third term of (F-2). Hence, from (F-3), the sufficient condition is 
shown in the following: 
 
1
1
~
~


tt
tt
WRn
dR
Wn
   
and 
tt
t
t Wd
n
R



1
1
~
~  
                                           
 
  
 
26 
 
Appendix G: Proof of Example 2 
 
  It is possible to transform (36) using the equations of Appendix D. 
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